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Abstract
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a
model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling
services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling policy
may be successful at eliminating smugglers by eroding their profits
but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases
migration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-off
we show that legalisation through selling visas in combination with
repression can be used to weaken human smuggling while controlling
migration flows. Our results highlight the complementarities between
repression and selling visas and call into question current policies.
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1 Introduction
Crossing borders illegally entails very high financial costs. This is true for
the border from Mexico to the US or from Libya to the EU with smugglers
fees ranging from $2,000 to $10,000.1 Costs are even higher for long distance
migration, which is difficult to undertake without the help of smugglers. For
example, crossing to the UK from Afghanistan with fake identification costs
above GBP25,000 and from China above GBP40,000.2 This makes human
smuggling a lucrative business. Total income raised by smugglers who oper-
ate between Mexico and the US is estimated around 6 billion dollars per year
(UNODC 2010). The European market, which is more fragmented due to its
multiple points of entries, is harder to evaluate.3 Nevertheless it is sizable and
is booming since 2015 with the surge of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and
Iraq. Over the years, human smuggling has merged with other types of ille-
gal transnational activities such as drug shipping and prostitution (UNODC
2010). Led by international criminals organizations, sometimes in connection
with terrorist organizations (Vaicius and Isacson 2003), these activities pose
a threat to the rule of law in countries of origin, transit, and destination.
Although it is important for policy makers to understand how to control
such criminal networks, there are surprisingly very few studies on the supply
side of illegal migration (noticeable exceptions are Friebel and Guriev, 2006,
Gathmann, 2008 and Tamura, 2010, 2013). Our paper contributes to this
literature, first, by studying the industrial organization of smuggling, no-
tably smugglers’ pricing and supply of services. Second, by exploring what
type of economic policies can be implemented to weaken smugglers and their
1For fees between Mexico and the US see UNODC (2010). For fees between Libya
and the EU see ”Smugglers use social media to lure migrants in the Mediterranean”
by Christopher Miller April 25, 2015. http://mashable.com/2015/04/25/mediterranean-
smugglers-facebook/.
2See the website http://www.havocscope.com/black-market-prices/human-smuggling-
fees/ which gives references to its sources of information.
3Padgett (2003) reports that in 2003 smugglers earned over e4 billion in the EU and
$5 billion revenues in the US.
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associated criminalities.
Current migration policies, which combine quotas on visas with repression
of illegal migration, are very ineffective against smugglers.4 In fact, strong
restrictions on labour mobility imply that many candidates are obliged to
arrange migration with the help of intermediaries who organise air, sea or
ground transportation and provide them with forged documents, clothes,
food and accommodation during the trip. The market of illegal migration is
large with illegal migrants representing sizeable proportions of foreign popu-
lations living in high wages countries. In the USA, 11 million of immigrants
do not have legal status, representing 3.5% of the total population (More-
house and Blomfield 2010). Most of them came across the Mexican land
border and 90% of them were assisted by small scale professional smugglers,
who are in large number (UNODC 2010). This market alone raises more
than US$5 billion revenue annually.5
In Europe, the market is smaller than in the US, with an estimated 1.8 to
3.3 million irregular foreign residents living in the EU15, representing 0.46%
to 0.83% of the population in 2008.6 The market is also more fragmented.
Since the routes for migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe are shifting
in response to enforcement efforts, the smugglers are often opportunistic
entrepreneurs who take advantage of the 42,672 km of coasts and 8,826 km of
land borders of the Schengen area to smuggle people. And in some countries
like the UK smugglers are involved in around 75% of detected cases of illegal
border crossing (IND, 2001). Recently, there has been an expansion of human
smuggling due to the wars in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, pushing more
4Worldwide, the International Labour Organisation estimates that 10%
to 15% of migration today involves migration under irregular situations
(http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09 492 engl.pdf).
5The Mexican Migration Project estimates that the probability of being apprehended
at the border is about 20% for Mexicans. Some 661,000 Mexicans were apprehended at
the border in 2008. Five times 661,000 is 3.3 million entries. If 90% of these entries are
made through a smuggler and the amount paid per entry is US$2,000 on average this
yields approximatively 6 billion in 2008 (UNODC 2010).
6See http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/ or Dustmann and Frattini, 2011.
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than 1 million people to cross the Mediterranean Sea in 2015. Smugglers,
who are mainly based in Libya, are packing migrants in boats for fees varying
between 2,000 and 10,000 euros7 and overload them to maximise their profits.
This resulted in an estimated 4,000 people drowned while trying to cross the
Mediterranean Sea in 2015.8
The smuggling markets on these two main routes (Latin America to the
US and Africa to Europe) appear to be in the hand of many small smugglers.
However, before the recent refugee crisis, it was estimated that half of the
irregular migrants entering the EU were arriving by plane, either overstaying
after the expiration of short term visas, or with fraudulent documentations
provided by smugglers.9 For long haul migration the smuggling market is
more concentrated as it involves more sophisticated operations and requires
larger and broader networks to transport illegally people over long distance
(UNODC 2014). Prices are also higher.
Since repressive policies are ineffective at curtailing smuggling, this paper
proposes legalisation to weaken human smuggling and its associated negative
externalities. Our analysis shows that the sale of visas at smugglers’ price,
or higher, will not be sufficient to eliminate smugglers. Indeed prohibition
creates a barrier to entry into the market. Criminal organisations rely on
this legal barrier, and on violence, to cartelize the industry and to charge
high prices. Smugglers will respond to the sale of visas by lowering the
price they propose and still make a profit. We may also expect the high
prices charged by smugglers not to affect all immigrants equally but to act
as a positive selection with higher prices disproportionately reducing the flow
of lower income immigrants.10 In this context, a sale of visas will increase
7”Smugglers use social media to lure migrants in the Mediterranean Sea” by C. Miller
April 25, 2015. http://mashable.com/2015/04/25/mediterranean-smugglers-facebook/
8”Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in graphics” 28 January 2016 BBC
News http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911
9http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media 147171 en.pdf CLANDESTINO Project, Final
Report, November 2009
10Similar effects were reported by multiple contemporary accounts following the
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migration flows and lower the average skill composition of migrants. In other
contexts, in which migrants may come from the lower or middle parts of the
skill distribution, we also find that a sale of visas will increase migration flows
and widen their skill diversity. We then explore a policy, which combines visa
pricing tools to push the smugglers out of the market and repressive tools to
limit the subsequent increases in migration flows.
To be more specific, in our model the demand comes from individuals
who choose to work in the foreign country or in the origin country, weigh-
ing the benefits of higher wages in foreign countries against migration costs.
Migration price is determined by smugglers who maximise their profits. Poli-
cies shape the market structure. They may reinforce the market power of
the smugglers by increasing their costs to operate and hence their prices, or
force them to propose lower prices to compete with the visas on sale. We will
see that neither traditional repressive measures nor pricing tools through the
sale of visas are satisfactory policies. The former helps to control migration
flows but, far from suppressing smugglers, they may even increase their mar-
ket power and the price paid by the migrants for their service. The latter
help to eradicate smugglers’ activities at the cost of substantially increasing
migration flows.
In advanced economies this outcome is difficult to sustain politically as
there is a strong popular demand for migration control. For instance, a recent
poll shows that immigration is now seen by European citizens as the most
important issue facing the EU and 85% of all EU citizens surveyed in 2015
agree that additional measures need to be taken to fight illegal immigration
from outside the EU.11
The paper then explores how a combination of pricing tools and repres-
sion measures can be used in a more innovative way to weaken smugglers
cartelization of the shipping industry at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century (see
Deltas et al 2008).
11See Eurobarometer83, Spring 2015: http://ec.europa.eu/public opinion/archives/eb
/eb83/eb83 first en.pdf
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while achieving pre-defined migration targets. We do not discuss the op-
timality of such targets, which in our set-up can be low or high, nor the
restrictive migration policies adopted by most advanced economies or their
lax enforcement (for an analysis of such issues see Facchini and Testa, 2011).
We simply explore how the sale of visas combined with various repressive
measures may be effective at weakening smugglers, or even eradicating them
depending on the objective, while controlling migration flows.
The rationing mechanism of our policy is through pricing the visas at the
level that squeezes smugglers’ profits. It is thus qualitatively different from
current policies: it does not impose quotas on specific visas, which has the
perverse consequence to generate markets for illegal services for those who
are not eligible. And the visas we propose are sold at a competitive price
in order to legalise migration flows by pushing smugglers out of business.
These visas are thus in nature and scope very different from the ”Golden
Investor Visas” sold by many countries around the world, which leave a large
margin for smugglers to operate on ”low-costs” markets (see more details in
the policy conclusions).12
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section positions
our paper in the literature. Section 3 presents the set-up of the model and
the market structure for illegal migration under status quo (absence of le-
galisation). Section 4 analyses the effects of introducing pricing tools and
repressive measures on smugglers’ profits and migration flows. Section 5 dis-
cusses the robustness of the results and their policy implications. Section 6
concludes.
12This legalisation policy is also very different from exceptional amnesties, which have
been repeatedly granted in the past to illegal migrants living in European countries such as
Spain, Greece or in the US and pose an obvious problem of time consistency and credibility
of the state. See Chau, 2001, Epstein and Weiss, 2001, Karlson et al., 2003, Solano, 2009
on the rationale and optimal design of amnesties. See Maas, 2009, on their questionable
effectiveness at decreasing the number of illegal migrants.
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2 Links with the literature
Despite the growing interest in human smuggling and the policy issue of mi-
gration control, there have been surprisingly very few studies on the supply
side of the market for illegal migration. Friebel and Guriev (2006) model
how smugglers establish labour/debt contracts with poor migrants, which
force them to repay their fee. In this context, they show that deportation
and border control policies do not have the same effects on illegal migration:
stricter deportation policies may increase the flow of illegal immigrants and
worsen the skill composition of immigrants while stricter border controls de-
crease overall immigration and may result in an increase in debt-financed
migration. A key assumption of their model is that migrants are liquidity
constrained and cannot pay upfront the fee, which gives rise to these con-
tracts.13 In a different context where contracts are not legally enforceable
between traffickers and smuggled migrants, which leads to migrants’ exploita-
tion, Tamura (2010) shows that destination countries with limited resources
may prefer to improve the apprehension of smugglers and their clients at the
border rather than inland. Similarly, in a setting of asymmetric information,
Tamura (2013) shows that improved inland apprehension may increase the
incidence of migrants exploitation.
Our paper complements this literature by studying the industrial organi-
sation of the smuggling industry. In particular it helps to explain where the
high prices, which lead to the establishment of labour/debt contracts first
analysed by Friebel and Guriev (2006) come from. Since our focus is on
weakening smugglers through the sale of visas we do not detail how migrants
finance migration costs. However our results apply to the market of liquid-
ity constrained migrants who have to borrow to pay for the illegal crossing
13Migrants may also respond to these debt labour contracts by choosing optimally the
duration of repayment period and consumption behaviour and this affects the complemen-
tarities between border controls, deportation measures and employer sanctions as studied
by Djajic´ and Vinogradova, 2013, 2014.
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(either from a bank, the family network or a smuggler). Borrowing reduces
the net income liquidity constrained migrants will get out of the migration
investment, as they have to reimburse their debt.14
Gathman (2008) models how the re-inforcement of the Mexican to US
borders affects the flows of undocumented workers to the US, showing weak
deterrence effects on flows but significant increases in prices charged by smug-
glers as their costs of operation are higher. In the same line, we investigate
the effects of several types of migration policies on the price for human smug-
gling services and the equilibrium of the human smuggling market. Our set
of policies is larger as it includes different types of repression and an innova-
tive visa selling policy to weaken the market power of smugglers. Moreover,
we leave completely flexible the degree of market concentration. Our model
embeds all possible cases, encompassing the two extreme cases of monopoly
and perfect competition modelled by Gathmann (2008) and the cases of
oligopolistic markets organised by highly cartelised networks of smugglers
documented by the literature on the economics of crime (Aronowitz, 2001;
Futo and Jandl, 2007; Guerette and Clarke, 2005; Lundgren, 2008). Since
cartelisation of smugglers varies across routes and may also change over time,
our framework allows us to straightforwardly endogenise the number of smug-
glers operating on a route to capture some effects of increased repression in
our general set-up of human smuggling markets.
In contrast to Gathman (2008) we are interested in individuals who can
only use the services of smugglers to migrate illegally. This suits the evidence
on illegal migration from Africa to Europe through the Mediterranean and on
long haul migration, where the presence of several borders and geographical
obstacles such as seas, generally prevent individuals from undertaking the
14Note that financial constraints are likely to be less binding with the introduction of
visas as migrants could more easily get loans. And legalisation diminishes the scope for
human trafficking as laws can be more easily enforced against exploitative smugglers (see
Friebel and Guriev, 2006, on indebted migrants; Tamura, 2010, 2013 or Mahmoud and
Trebesch, 2010 on trafficked migrants).
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crossing by their own means. This is also consistent with the bulk of illegal
migration to the USA from Mexico, where it is estimated that 90% of the
illegal migrants use the services of coyotes (UNODC 2010). And regarding
the design of innovative policies to erode smugglers’ profits, the possibility to
cross without using their services would only weaken their position as they
now face competition from the two ends of their demand (on the high end
from individuals who will pay for visas, on the low end from individuals using
their own means to cross). If anything it makes it easier for a government to
weaken them through the legalisation policy we propose.
As highlighted in our paper, the cost-effectiveness of the policies we study
strongly depends on several key parameters that affect the elasticities of mi-
gration demand. The empirical literature on the effectiveness of border en-
forcement measures (Donato et al., 1992, Massey and Espinosa, 1997, Hanson
and Spilimbergo, 1999, Hanson et al., 2002, Angelucci 2012) has focused on
cross border migration between the US and Mexico and points to a small or
insignificant effect of stricter deportation rules and stricter border controls af-
ter the Immigration Reform and Control Act on migration flows (for a review
see Hanson, 2006). For example, using detailed data on cross-border trips of
illegal workers from the Mexican Migration Project, Gathmann (2008) shows
that when the price to cross the border with the help of coyotes increases,
migrants may choose to migrate by their own means and forego the services
of smugglers by taking additional risks to cross the border in more remote
areas.
It is striking that there is no empirical work on the effectiveness of re-
pressive measures at the workplace, as for example, sanctions towards em-
ployers of illegal migrants. Yet policies targeting the users/consumers of
the illegal services have proven to be very effective on other illegal markets
such as prostitution in Sweden (Waltman 2011).15 Other studies such as
15see also http://www.government.se/articles/2011/03/evaluation-of-the-prohibition-
of-the-purchase-of-sexual-services/
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Cadena and Kovak (2016) show that low-skilled Mexican-born immigrants
responded strongly to changes in local labor demand in the US during the
Great Recession, suggesting that abating demand for illegal work should lead
to significant decreases in illegal migration.
Also striking is the lack of evidence on the price elasticity of long haul il-
legal migration. All we know empirically is that long distance legal migration
responded strongly to changes in the market structure of shipping cartels at
the beginning of the 20th century. This has been tested empirically by Deltas
et al (2008), who show that the existence of relatively tight, well-organized
cartels restricted the flow of transatlantic migrants below what would have
occurred in a more competitive environment. This suggests that if the gov-
ernment manages to successfully monopolise the migration market through
selling visas, it may also be able to regulate migration flows.
Finally, from a technical viewpoint, the theoretical literature on illegal im-
migration control focuses on risk neutral agents. Following the seminal paper
by Ethier (1986), which highlights the interest of combining border and do-
mestic enforcement measures to unbundle their wage effects from their effect
on the volume of immigrants, Epstein et al. (1999), Schiff (2011) and Djajic´
(1999, 2013) take into account more dynamic aspects, as migrants who en-
ter legally may subsequently move into the illegal sector in order to avoid
deportation. For simplicity of exposition, our results are also derived under
the assumption that illegal migration entails no risk, or alternatively that
migrants are risk neutral. However they still hold under the more realistic
assumptions that illegal migration is risky and migrants are risk averse (see
Auriol and Mesnard, 2012), which, with the noticeable exceptions of Wood-
land and Yoshida (2006) and Vinogradova (2010), has rarely been addressed
in previous studies on illegal immigration control.
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3 Migration equilibrium
This section studies the migration market equilibrium, when workers pay
a migration price (fee) to the smugglers, p, to migrate illegally to a high
wages destination country. We thereby assume that individuals need to hire
a smuggler to migrate. For simplicity of exposition, the analysis is derived
under the assumption that illegal migration entails no risk or alternatively
that migrants are risk-neutral. In section 5 we discuss the robustness of our
results to the introduction of risk. It turns out that they are fairly robust.
3.1 Demand for illegal migration
At the beginning of her working life of total duration 1, a worker maximises
her lifetime utility. She chooses to locate either abroad or in her home country
and consumes all her income.16
Potential candidates for illegal migration are heterogeneous according to
their labour efficiency (or skill), θ, which is drawn from the distribution
F (θ) with support
[
θ, θ
]
, 0 ≤ θ ≤ θ. It is assumed that the distribution
F (θ) is twice differentiable with a density function f(θ) > 0. Term θ can be
interpreted as the threshold of skill/education level above which workers can
apply for visas under the current system of selective migration characterising
most OECD countries.
If there is no migration visa for sale, we assume that workers can only work
in the illegal sector of the economy such that expected earnings abroad are
dθwf , with θwf being the wages in the legal sector and d < 1. The discount
factor d captures the fact that workers would have more opportunities if they
worked legally rather than illegally.17 We assume for the moment that d is
16As the model is static, there is no sequential decision. However would-be migrants
internalize the risk of deportation and sanctions of their employers. In the risk-neutral
case this translates into a lower expected wage to work in the illegal sector than in the
legal sector.
17It is for example the case if they cannot easily change employer in the illegal sector or
if they are caught in a debt-labour contract upon arrival (see Friebel and Guriev, 2006).
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exogenous but we will relax this assumption in section 4.5.18
The worker knows the discounted income she will earn in the foreign coun-
try on the illegal market, dθwf , which is assumed higher than the discounted
income in home country θwh:
dwf > wh
Note that the labour market is considered exogenous, which is justified by
the fact that the number of workers on the labour market is very large as
compared to the flows of migrants. 19 Earnings in the foreign country are
used to pay the smuggler’s fee p and to consume θdwf − p. If the worker
does not migrate, she consumes θwh in the origin country.
20 Therefore the
worker decides to migrate if her life time utility, equal to u(θdwf − p) in case
she migrates, is higher than her utility in case she does not migrate, equal
to u(θwh). With increasing utility functions and no risk, or risk neutrality
(i.e., linear utility functions) the migration condition can be rewritten as:
θwh < θdwf − p
This is the simplest way to model the returns to skills leading to a positive
selection of illegal migrants (i.e., a worker is more likely to migrate the higher
her skill level, θ), which characterises long haul migration. Indeed ”Greater
distances, [...] and (for the poorest regions) the poverty constraint all imply
that US and EU migrants coming from farther away should be more posi-
tively selected” (Hatton and Williamson, 2008). Accordingly, the empirical
18This will reflect the fact that employing undocumented workers is more costly as
repression against employers is enforced.
19Empirical evidence shows very small or non significant impacts of immigration on
wages of natives (see for instance Card 1990).
20She perfectly knows the wages per unit of time that she will get at home and abroad
and the discount rate. She computes the net present value of her future flow of income.
Since wages and discount rate are exogenous we avoid introducing separate notation and
directly focus on net present values.
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evidence on long haul legal migration points to positive selection (see Akee,
2010 on migrants from Federated States of Micronesia to the US during 1995-
1997 or Beine et al, 2007 on migration to countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development). Similarly, long distance illegal
migration leads to a more positive selection of workers than that which has
been documented for the Mexican cross border migration (see Rivera-Batiz,
2004 for a comparative analysis of Mexican and non-Mexican illegal migrants
in the US and Camarota, 2012 for descriptive statistics on education and in-
come by country of origin of both legal and illegal migrants in the US).
Modifying the assumptions of the model to capture differently the rela-
tive returns to skill in foreign/home country (see Borjas, 1987, Grogger and
Hanson, 2011) only affects the type of workers self-selecting through migra-
tion but does not not change the main results of the paper.21 Appendix E
shows this for one case of negative selection and a similar reasoning can be
extended to the case of an intermediary selection due to liquidity constraints
in line with the mixed evidence on cross-border migration from Mexico to the
US (Chiquiar and Hanson 2005, Orrenius and Zavodny 2005, Moraga 2011,
Kaestner and Malamud, 2011, Angelucci 2013).
Solving for the skill level such that an individual is indifferent between
migrating illegally or not, we obtain the illegal migration threshold θI written
as:
θI :=
p
dwf − wh (1)
And aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand for
illegal migration as a function of migration price p:
DI(p) =
∫ θ
θI
f(θ)dθ = 1− F (θI) = 1− F ( p
dwf − wh ) (2)
21The sale of visas used as the only policy instrument leads to larger flows of migrants
and increases their diversity (see Proposition 2). And the mechanism design of the combi-
nation of different instruments to achieve a double objective characterised in Proposition
3 remains the same whatever the type of selection or heterogeneity we may consider.
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As θI increases with p and decreases with d, the demand for migration is
higher the lower the migration price, p, and the higher the wage differential
dwf−wh between the two countries. It is worth noting that when individuals
are risk averse and illegal immigration involves risk, there is a more positive
selection of migrants, in the sense that the lower skill threshold of migrants
lies above the one defined in (1) for risk neutral individuals (see Auriol and
Mesnard 2012). This is an intuitive result. Since illegal migration involves
risk, risk averse individuals are less willing to undertake the risky journey
than risk neutral ones.
3.2 Supply of services
Because legal restrictions constitute barriers to market entry, the smuggling
business is not competitive. A few criminal networks actually provide the
service (see Aronowitz, 2001; Futo and Jandl, 2007; Guerette and Clarke,
2005, Lundgren, 2008). The longer the distances and the more complex the
smuggling operations are, the more concentrated the sector is likely to be.
However for other routes, such as the crossing of the Mediterranean Sea or
of the land border between Mexico and the USA, there is a larger number of
small enterprises. To take into account these different market structures we
model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as a generalized Cournot
competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e., each smuggler has the
same market share). The generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN ,
is such that:
pN − c
pN
=
1
N
1
εDI ,p
(3)
where c represents their marginal costs, εDI ,p is the price elasticity of demand
and N is an integer greater than 1. The generalized Cournot competition
demand, DI(pN), is between the two extreme cases: DI(pm) ≤ DI(pN) ≤
DI(c) for all N ≥ 1 where pm ≡ p1 in the monopoly case (when N = 1) and
p∞ = c in the competitive case when N →∞. The detail of the computation
14
and an illustration in the case of uniform distribution is given in Appendix
A.
Note that, in a more dynamic perspective, one could easily endogenise N ,
the number of smugglers on the market. Denoting K the level of sunk costs
to enter this market, the number of smugglers N is the integer part of n such
that pi(n) = K where pi(n) = (pn − c)DI(pn)/n is the firm rent. Therefore
any repressive measure increasing c or K reduces the number of smugglers
on the market, N , thereby increasing the price they charge for their services,
as captured by equation (3) above.
It is also worth noting that the smugglers might face different populations
of migrants. Some of them might be more price sensitive and less risk averse
than other. For instance, illiterate candidates from rural areas are different
from educated workers from urban centers. If the oligopolistic smugglers can
identify them, they will apply different prices to these different populations.
As is standard with third degree price discrimination, groups endowed with
the largest price elasticity will get the smallest price. In contrast captive
migrants (i.e., groups with low price elasticity) face higher prices.22
4 Policies
Illegal activities linked to human smuggling entail large negative externalities
for societies.23 In Mexico for example, human smuggling is integrated with
22Assume that they are J different pools of migrants identified by j = 1, ..., J . The skill
parameter of workers in group j are distributed identically and independently according
to the density function fj(θ) and distribution Fj(θ) over
[
θj , θj
]
. Their wages might
also be type dependent: {wfj , whj}. The demand for migration in group j is DIj (p) =∫ θj
θIj (p)
fj(θ)dθ = 1 − Fj(θIj (p)), where θIj (p) = pdwfj−whj . The optimal smuggler prices
determined by (3) vary from one group to the other according to the price elasticity of its
demand εDIj ,p = −
pDI′j (p)
DIj (p)
.
23Trafficking victims coming from 127 countries have been found in 137 countries around
the world. It is estimated that there are at least 2.4 million persons who are the victims
of trafficking at any time. Approximately 79% of these victims are trafficked for sexual
15
the drug business and other criminal activities, which lead to high insecu-
rity and became recently one of the main electoral concerns.24 This is also
true for OECD countries, where governments spend considerable resources
in an attempt to eradicate this business. For example, Sweden and Aus-
tralia have recently adopted strict policies against such criminal networks.25
Similarly, in reaction to the most recent tragedy in the Mediterranean Sea
the extraordinary EU summit on 23 April 2015 adopted a 10-point plan.
This plan includes the reinforcement of EU border control operations (Tri-
ton and Poseidon) in the Mediterranean Sea with more equipment and an
extension of the EU operation area. It also proposes a systematic effort to
fight against smugglers by capturing and destroying their vessels. Finally, in
the United States, billions are spent each year to protect the Mexican border
from human smugglers (see the discussion in section 5.3).
One concern with the actual restrictive policies is that they never ex-
plicitly internalize the cost of the negative externalities (loss of human life,
corruption, money laundering, violence, terrorism, slavery, etc) imposed by
the criminal activities that emerge as a result of the prohibition. The pol-
icy makers who decide on the repression simply assume that it will work,
while the police is dealing with the criminality in a separate way. From an
economic perspective this is not efficient. Internalizing the costs of crime
implies that the size of the illegal migration business has to be downsized.
Whatever the migration target is, we study the optimal way to weaken these
criminal networks. Before exploring different government policies in the next
exploitation and the rest for forced labour. They generate an estimated profit of over
US$30 billion every year (UNODC 2012).
24The Economist, June 30, 2011. Time Magazine, August 12, 2003 :
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,474582-2,00.html
25In its budget 2011-2012 the Australian Government has for instance specifically ear-
marked ”$292 million to support a new Regional Cooperation Framework that will help
put people smugglers out of business and prevent asylum seekers making the dangerous
journey to Australia by boat.” See the Webpage of the Australian Government:
http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Budgets/Budget2011/Mediareleases/Pages/
Strengtheningourbordersthroughregionalcooperation.aspx
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subsections, it is necessary to study how the illegal sector will react to various
attempts to legalise the migration business.
To determine the pricing scheme for legal migrants the government, a
Stackelberg leader, needs to take into account that the smugglers will react
to its policy.26 The model is thus solved by backwards induction.
4.1 Smugglers’ reaction to sale of visas
In order to weaken smugglers the government might try to push them out
of business by legalising the market for migration. To do so, it can create
a permit to migrate permanently that people can buy. A simple idea would
be to create a permit that will cost the same price, pL, as the price imposed
by the smugglers to illegal migrants, denoted pI : pL = pI .27 However,
this policy will increase migration flows. Comparing the legal migration
threshold, written as θL = p
wf−wh , with (1), it is easy to see that, for any
given migration price p, the legal migration threshold is always lower than
the illegal one: θL(p) < θI(p) ∀p > 0. This is because migration pay-offs are
higher under legal than illegal migration, which increases the wage differential
between foreign and home countries. More importantly such a pricing policy
of legal migration will not eradicate smuggling.
By comparing the payoffs if an individual of type θ migrates legally, θwf−
pL, with the payoffs if she migrates illegally, dθwf −pI , we can determine the
threshold type, θL, defined as :
θL :=
pL − pI
(1− d)wf (4)
such that any individual above this threshold prefers to migrate legally than
26Once the government announces its policy, it must stick to it to be credible. The
smugglers adjust their prices in reaction to the legal offer.
27For simplicity, we consider that this price represents the total costs including migra-
tion costs paid by migrants to enter legally the foreign country since migration costs are
typically small and depend strongly on the type of travel chosen.
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illegally. We can easily check that ∂θL/∂d > 0. This simply says that the
larger the income differential between the legal and illegal sectors, the more
individuals prefer to migrate legally than illegally.
Using (1), we can write the threshold type θI = p
I
dwf−wh above which an
individual prefers to migrate illegally through the smugglers than to stay
in her origin country. If θL < θI nobody chooses to migrate illegally. A
constraint for the smugglers is to fix their price low enough as compared to
the price of a legal permit in order to attract the workers of type between θI
and θL.
This constraint can be written as : p
I
dwf−wh <
pL−pI
(1−d)wf or, equivalently, as:
pI <
dwf − wh
wf − wh p
L (5)
This shows that the lower the relative payoffs of illegal migration as compared
to legal migration, captured by the ratio
dwf−wh
wf−wh , and the lower the legal
price of migration, pL, the more difficult it is for the smugglers to satisfy this
constraint.
Under this constraint, the demand faced by the smugglers is:
DI(pI , pL) =
∫ pL−pI
(1−d)wf
pI
dwf−wh
f(θ)dθ. (6)
Let pN(pL) be the solution of (3) computed with the direct price elasticity of
demand (6), εDI ,pI = −∂D
I(pI ,pL)
∂pI
pI
DI(pI ,pL)
, which depends on pL . The price
reaction function of the smugglers is the solution of the following equation:28
pI(pL) =
{
pN(pL) if c ≤ pN(pL) < dwf−wh
wf−wh p
L
∅ otherwise
(7)
This shows that the reaction price of the smugglers is increasing in the
28Appendix C presents the closed form solution obtained in the uniform distribution
case (see equation (26)).
18
marginal costs for smugglers to operate, c, in the price of visa, pL, in the wage
differential between foreign and home countries, wf − wh, and decreasing in
the number of smugglers, N .
We are now ready to study how different economic tools can be used to
weaken criminality and their effects on the migration market. We start with
the limit case of the full eradication of the smugglers. This policy is optimal
when the negative externalities generated by the mafias are very large.
4.2 Eliminating smugglers through selling visas
We first consider a policy, which aims at breaking all incentives to smuggle
by selling visas at a low enough price, such that the smugglers will have non
positive profits. This requires that the reaction price is pushed below the
marginal costs, i.e. pI(pL) ≤ c.
The threshold price, denoted pL, below which the smugglers exit the
market is such that θL = θI defined respectively in equations (4) and (1) for
pI = c. That is, pL is such that:
pL−c
(1−d)wf =
c
dwf−wh . This yields:
pL =
wf − wh
dwf − wh c (8)
In other words, the government that wants to push smugglers’ reaction price
down until their mark-up vanishes has to apply the price pL. Note that this
result applies to any initial structure of the market for smugglers: monopolist,
oligopolistic or competitive. Irrespective of the initial market conditions, if
the government wants to eradicate smugglers by selling visas it has to apply
pL such that the smugglers end up reaching their marginal costs pricing.29
Comparing pL =
wf−wh
dwf−wh c and p
∞ = c we can establish, since d < 1, that
the price imposed by the government to eliminate the smugglers is higher than
29The same reasoning also holds irrespective of the way the competition between the
smugglers is modelled in quantity, as modelled in the present paper, or in price.
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the price imposed by smugglers under perfect competition. Nevertheless, the
migration demand, which is now legal, can be written as:
DL(pL) =
∫ θ
c(
wf−wh
dwf−wh
)
wf−wh
f(θ)dθ
DL(pL) = 1− F
(
c
dwf − wh
)
(9)
This demand is exactly the same as the demand for illegal migration un-
der perfect competition of smugglers: DL(pL) = DI(c). This is because, for
a given migration price, more workers are willing to migrate legally than
illegally. This result, which, as explained in Section 5, is robust to the intro-
duction of risk aversion, is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 The highest-price policy that reduces the number of illegal
migrants to zero through the sale of visas yields the same level of migration
as under perfect competition among smugglers.
It is not possible to empirically test the predictions of Proposition 1 since
no country has, so far, used such a pricing scheme to eradicate human smug-
gling. However, the theoretical framework, which is quite general, applies to
other markets with positive demand and legal prohibition. The theory pre-
dicts that eliminating smugglers by legalising their activity will inevitably
increase the demand of the formerly prohibited product or service. It is thus
useful to look at other products and services, such as alcohol or sexual ser-
vices, that are, or have been, successively prohibited and legalised to assess
the relevance of Proposition 1. For example Miron and Zwiebel (1991) find
that the consumption of alcohol fell sharply during the Prohibition in the US
(1920-1933) and Poulin (2005) claims that the legalisation of prostitution in
countries such as the Netherland, Germany or Australia, has generated an
expansion of this industry.
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It is clear that more empirical studies are called to understand the con-
sequences of legalisation through a sale of visas. Yet, based on the theory
and on the available empirical evidence on other illegal markets, we predict
a sharp increase in migration flows if visas are sold at the price that drive
the smugglers out of business. The higher the initial market concentration
the larger the increase following the legalisation.
4.3 The policy trade-off: controlling migration flows
Such increases may not be acceptable in most OECD countries, where there
is a strong popular demand for controlling migration flows (see section 1).
As we mentioned earlier we do not discuss here the optimality of such an
objective but simply analyse whether standard economic instruments can
help to reach it. We thus study what happens if the government sells visas
to control migration flows. A constraint for the government is that the price
of these visas, pL, has to be lower than pL, the threshold price above which
no worker will migrate legally. This threshold is the minimum value of two
constraints. The first one is such that someone at least prefers to migrate
legally than stay at home. In principal-agent literature this type of constraint
is referred to as individual rationality constraint (IR). The second threshold
is such that someone at least prefers to migrate legally than illegally, referred
to as the incentive compatibility constraint (IC).
• (IR) pL ≤ θ(wf − wh)
• (IC) pL ≤ θ(1− d)wf + pI
The legal migration is positive if and only if pL ≤ min
{
θ(wf −wh), θ(1−
d)wf + p
I
}
. Since by assumption, dwf > wh it is easy to check that the
(IC) constraint is binding whenever the smugglers are active. Indeed θ(wf −
wh) > θ(1 − d)wf + pI is equivalent to pI < θ(dwf − wh), which, by virtue
of (1), necessarily holds when the smugglers are active. We deduce that
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pL = θ(1 − d)wf + pI . Since the smugglers price, pI(pL), is endogenously
determined in equation (7), the threshold pL is a fixed point such that:
pL = θ(1− d)wf + pI(pL) (10)
Under the assumption that ∂
2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI∂pL
≥ 0, which is true as long as f ′(θ) ≤
0 (e.g., with a uniform distribution of skills ∂
2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI∂pL
= 0), one can check
that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 (see Appendix B). This implies that pL exists and is unique.
Indeed if pL = 0 then θ(1− d)wf + pI(0) > 0, while θ(1− d)wf + pI(+∞) =
θ(1− d)wf + pN < +∞ where pN is defined in equation (3). We deduce that
pL and θ(1− d)wf + pI(pL) cross once and only once at pL > 0. It is worth
noting that, contrary to pL which is invariant, pL decreases in N the number
of smugglers active in the market, an intuitive result.
We want to study the objective function of a government that would aim
at minimizing the increase in migration flows following the introduction of
sale of visas. Since the status quo level of immigration is independent of the
new policy to sell visas, this objective is equivalent to minimizing migration
flows following this scheme. By using (1) the objective function is :
min
pL≤pL
∫ θ
pI (pL)
dwf−wh
f(θ)dθ = min
pL≤pL
[
1− F
(
pI(pL)
dwf − wh
)]
(11)
where the government internalizes the reaction function of the smuggler
pI(pL) in (7). Since dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 differentiating equation (11) with respect
to pL yields − 1
dwf−whf
(
pI(pL)
dwf−wh
)
dpI(pL)
dpL
≤ 0. A government, which aims at
minimizing migration flows, will fix the highest possible price for its visas pL.
The migration demand under such policy is higher than in the case of
an unconstrained smuggler oligopoly. Indeed when pL ≤ pL ≤ θ(wf − wh),
the smugglers are the only ones to be active on the market as nobody wants
to migrate legally if the smugglers apply their optimal reaction price pI(pL).
However they cannot apply the unconstrained oligopoly price pN of equation
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(3) as some migrants would then choose legal migration, lowering the smug-
glers’ profit. This entails larger migration flows even though no visa is sold
in such case.30
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate this result in the uniform example. Figure 1
shows the price reaction function charged by smugglers, pI(pL), as defined
by (7) where the slope of the active part of the reaction function, pN(pL) =
pL
N+1
dwf−wh
wf−wh +
N
N+1
c, decreases with N ≥ 1 (see equation (26) in the appendix).
It becomes flat when N goes to infinity (i.e. it converges to the constant value
of c).31 Figure 2 shows the corresponding total demand for migration, which
is clearly higher when visas are on sale (on the left of the picture) as compared
to the situation of unconstrained smugglers. These Figures illustrate that,
for a given level of investment in repression, the government has the choice
between different policies. One extreme policy represented on the left of
the pictures is to sell visa at a price below pL such that the smugglers are
eradicated and only legal migrants are entering the country. In this case
(total) migration flows are the largest. At the other end (on the right side)
migration flows are minimized but the smugglers are making the highest
possible rents as they behave unconstrained. For intermediate situations,
the smugglers are weakened (their profits are smaller) but flows are larger.
Depending on its objectives a government may choose any outcome varying
in the feasible range.
Moreover, larger migration flows following a sale of visas lead to increasing
the skill diversity of migrants. This effect is stronger if one takes into account
that individuals are risk averse and illegal immigration involves risk, which
30Smugglers are unconstrained to apply the oligopolistic price only if pL > θ(wf −wh).
31With the uniform distribution example, replacing pI(pL) = p
L
N+1
dwf−wh
wf−wh +
N
N+1c into (10) the upper limit for the visa price satisfies: p
L =
[Nc+ (1 +N)(1− d)wf ] wf−wh(1−d)wf+N(wf−wh) . Comparing the reaction smugglers price
pI(pL) with the unconstrained smugglers’ oligopoly price pN defined in (3) it is straight-
forward to check that pI(pL) ≤ pN if and only if dwf − wh ≥ c, which is the necessary
condition for the smugglers being active in the first place (see Appendix C).
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increases the demand for visas as compared to the situation where they are
risk-neutral. This implies that, in the context of positive selection observed
through long haul migration, the buyers of visas will be drawn from a larger
pool of workers. This will decrease migrants’ average skill level and the
reverse is true with negative selection. The next proposition, which is robust
to the introduction of risk-aversion, summarizes the main findings of the
section:
Proposition 2 A sale of visas necessarily increases the total number of mi-
grants and increases their skill diversity.
Proposition 2 implies that a government that aims at minimizing the
demand for migration, cannot do better than an unconstrained monopoly
smuggler. So, if the objective is to decrease the total number of migrants,
there are more effective policies than selling migration visas.
4.4 Controlling migration flows through increased re-
pression
Using our previous results it is straightforward to check that any instrument
that either increases the costs for smugglers to operate, c, or to enter the
market, K, or decreases the benefits gained by illegal migrants, d, decreases
migration demand.
However, the analysis of smugglers pricing behavior outlines that repres-
sive policy measures may have very different effects depending on whether
they directly affect the smuggling business or the demand for their services:
any measure which increases the marginal costs for smugglers to operate, c,
such as increased border enforcement, or which increase the costs to enter
the market, K, will necessarily increase their cartelisation and increase the
fees paid by would be migrants. This has been documented by Roberts et
al (2010) who show that the increase in enforcement on the Southwest bor-
der of the US accounted for all of the increase in smuggling costs during
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2006-2008 and half of it during 2004-2008. They also note that rising smug-
gling prices during 2004-2008 also ”indicate increased demand for smuggling
services whose supply is limited, or changing characteristics of the market-
place such as the formation of cartels by smugglers”. In contrast, measures,
which decrease the benefits of illegal migration through a decrease in d, such
as sanctions to employers of illegal workers that are transmitted into lower
wages paid to illegal migrants, decrease the fees charged by smugglers (see
for example equation (18) in Appendix).
4.5 Migration control through sale of visas
So far we have considered two types of policies: one policy relies on visa
pricing schemes to eliminate smuggling, while the other policy is essentially
repressive and aims at controlling illegal migration flows. Both solutions
are politically unsatisfactory. The former leads to an increase in migration
flows, while the latter does not eradicate smugglers and increases their mar-
ket power (i.e., market concentration). In what follows we explore how a
combination of both types of approaches might help to simultaneously fight
the smugglers and control migration flows. This is perhaps not surprising
as two policy instruments are generally needed to achieve a double objective
(see for example Ethier, 1986).
We start from the status quo situation where the marginal cost to smuggle
is c and the discount rate to work as an illegal workers is d. The government
can allocate funds to increase the smugglers’ marginal costs by reinforcing
”external” (or border) controls. We denote c(R1) the marginal costs that the
smugglers face when the government invests R1 ≥ 0 in additional repression.
We assume that, in the absence of additional investment, the marginal costs
of the smuggler are the status quo level: c(0) = c. Moreover we assume that
c′(R1) > 0 and c′′(R1) < 0. The concave shape indicates decreasing returns
to scale in the fight against smugglers.
Similarly, the government can allocate funds to increase ”internal” con-
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trols at worksites and enforce the sanctions paid by the employers of illegal
migrants. We denote d(R2) the illegal migrant wage discount factor result-
ing from increased enforcement measures. Here again we assume that, in
the absence of additional investment d(0) = d, and that d′(R2) < 032 and
d′′(R2) > 0. The convex shape indicates decreasing returns to scale in the
fight against illegal employment.
Replacing c by c(R1) and d by d(R2) in (8), we can determine the new
legal migration price such that smugglers do not have any interest to operate
given their inflated marginal costs and reduced migrant wages:
pL(R1, R2) =
wf − wh
d(R2)wf − wh c(R1) (12)
We deduce that the increase in demand following the introduction of the sale
of visas for legal migration would be defined in (9) with the price pL being
replaced by pL(R1, R2):
DL(R1, R2) = 1− F
(
c(R1)
d(R2)wf − wh
)
(13)
Finally, the government chooses the investments R1 and R2 so as to minimise
the increase in migration flows following the introduction of visas, under its
budget constraint B as follows:
min
R1,R2
DL(R1, R2) s.t. R1 +R2 ≤ B. (14)
Focusing on interior solutions the optimal allocation of resources, which
is derived in Appendix D, is summarized in the next proposition.33
32See Woodland and Yoshida (2006) for a theoretical foundation of this assumption and
Cobb-Clark et al. (1995) for empirical evidence.
33Depending on the functions c(.) and d(.) it may be the case that the optimal solution
involves increasing c only (i.e., R2 = 0) or decreasing d only (i.e., R1 = 0). However, in
other cases there will be an interior solution defined in (15) and so that R1 +R2 = B.
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Proposition 3 A government with a budget constraint of B > 0 that aims at
dismantling smugglers while limiting the increase in migration flows following
the legalisation invests the amounts (R∗1, R
∗
2), solution of R1 + R2 = B and
of the following equation:
c′(R1)
c(R1)
=
−d′(R2)wf
d(R2)wf − wh (15)
Under the government budget constraint, the optimal allocation of the
budget for repression is such that the marginal impact of R1 on D
L is equal to
the marginal impact of R2 on D
L, as shown by (15). In other words, whatever
its migration target, the government should equalize the marginal impact of
investment in reinforcing border controls and in employers’ sanctions on the
demand for legal migration.
Since the demand for visas is a normal good and since c′(R1) > 0 (al-
ternatively d′(R2) < 0) it is straightforward to check that
dDL(R1,R2)
dR1
< 0
(and that dD
L(R1,R2)
dR2
< 0). When repression against smugglers increases,
the marginal cost of their activity, c, increases, which is transmitted to the
smugglers’ price. Similarly, when sanctions are enforced against employers
of illegal migrants, this is transmitted to the payoffs of migrants through a
decrease in d. As a result the government can raise the price of visas that
eliminates smugglers from the market. This policy enables the government
to control migration flows without relying on the help of smugglers. Indeed,
by construction, such policy pushes smugglers out of the market by eroding
their profits.
The optimal allocation of investment between internal and external re-
pression defined in (15) is very general. It does not depend on the govern-
ment migration target, nor on the amount of ressources the government is
willing to allocate to repression. As a special case, we consider a policy where
the funds raised from the sale of the legal permits are used to finance the
additional investments in repression. If the government does not want to
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increase the budget deficit, it will have to use the resources from the visas
sale to fund the additional investments in repression such that the budget
constraint becomes:
R1 +R2 = D
L(R1, R2)p
L(R1, R2). (16)
Proposition 3 is still valid but now R1 + R2 = B is replaced by (16), where
the budget B is endogenously defined. Moreover, enforcing the fines paid
by employers of undocumented workers may contribute to raising funds in
addition to the sale of visas, which could easily be embedded into our model
by adding a term (increasing with R2) on the right hand side of the budget
constraint in (16).
Alternatively we consider the objective to keep constant the level of mi-
gration (or any other quantitative objective) following the legalisation scheme
by allocating scarce resources into different types of repression. The prob-
lem is technically very similar. To see how it concretely works, let assume
that the skill distribution is uniform. The demand for illegal migration is
N
N+1
(
1− c
dwf−wh
)
(see Appendix A). If the government aims at keeping mi-
gration constant following legalisation through the sale of visa it must choose
repression levels so that DL(R1, R2) = 1 − c(R1)d(R2)wf−wh = NN+1
(
1 − c
dwf−wh
)
.
This equation and equation (15) determine the level of investments R∗1 and
R∗2, and hence the budget, which allows the government to reach the objective
of zero migration increase under the legalisation scheme.
5 Robustness and Policy Implications
5.1 Robustness to risk
So far we have considered either situations entailing no risk or risk neu-
tral individuals. These assumptions are not realistic. As migrating illegally
entails important risks and individuals are risk averse, this may be of sig-
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nificance to determine the number and type of migrants. It is important to
check the robustness of our basic results to the introduction of risk and risk
aversion. We conduct this robustness check exercise in Auriol and Mesnard
(2012). We extend the base model by introducing standard CARA utility
function u(x) = 1− exp(−ax), where a is the absolute risk aversion param-
eter. We also assume that illegal migration entails a risk: once migrants
pay the sunk costs to the smugglers and reach the destination country, they
may stay abroad with probability 1 − q, but have a probability q of being
deported and sent back to their home country. With risk averse migrants the
government has one more instrument to raise the visa price that drives the
smugglers out of business and, hence, limit migration flows. By investing in
repression it can, as before, increase marginal costs for smugglers to operate
(e.g., through borders’ controls), or decrease the benefits of working as an
illegal worker (e.g., through employers’ controls). In addition, it can also
increase the probability of deportation q (e.g., through internals’ controls).
This new instrument is relevant only under risk aversion.
Compared to the risk-neutral case the introduction of risk aversion tends
to lower the demand for illegal migration, an intuitive result. On the one
hand, in the absence of legal pricing schemes, illegal migration flows are lower
if individuals are risk averse than if they are risk neutral. On the other hand,
selling visas decreases illegal migration flows even further since risk-averse
individuals are less willing to bear the risk of deportation. As a result the visa
price, which drives the smugglers out of business, is higher with risk (when
individuals are risk averse and illegal immigration involves risk) than without.
Apart from this straightforward changes of the equilibrium thresholds the
exercice shows that the results in Proposition 1 and 2 are robust to the
introduction of risk. Proposition 3 is modified to integrate the new repressive
tool q, which is the probability of deportation. The logic of Proposition 3
is maintained throughout. The government allocates its budget between
border controls, employers’ sanctions and deportations of illegal migrants, to
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equalise their marginal effect on demand for illegal migration. We also find
that the amount of investment in deportation is higher than the investment
allocated to minimise expected earnings from illegal migration. This result,
in line with Becker (1968), simply states that since individuals are risk averse,
they respond more strongly to a change in the probability of deportation than
to a ”compensated” change in their earnings, which would leave equal their
expected earnings from migrating illegally.
5.2 Policy implications
The robustness exercise with risk also highlights the strong complementar-
ities between different types of instruments used to control migration flows
and the proposed policy of selling visas to squeeze smuggler’s profits. For
example the additional investments in internal/external controls required to
legalise and limit the subsequent increases in migration flows decrease with
the probability of deportation. Intuitively, as risk to migrate illegally in-
creases, smugglers have to lower their margin to be able to attract risk-averse
migrants. It is therefore easier to drive them out of business and keep migra-
tion demand constant following the legalisation policy we propose through a
sale of visas.
This relates to the cost-effectiveness of the policy: how effective is this
legalisation policy at limiting the increase in migration flows without weigh-
ing too much on public finances? The answer depends also strongly on the
elasticities of the functions c(R1) and d(R2). Policy makers have to take into
account that these elasticities vary from one country to the other. For exam-
ple, when there is a physical border between two countries it is difficult to
rise smugglers’ costs by increasing repression as documented for the Mexico
-US migration. Hence, the elasticity of the function c(R) is likely to be low.
By contrast, in the case of long-haul migration, it might be easier to increase
smugglers’ costs by reinforcing external controls. Similarly, the elasticity of
the function d(R) to an increase in internal repression (for example through
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controls at the workplace which increase the costs to employ illegal work-
ers) is presumably different in countries with a large informal sector than
in countries with a small informal economy. With inelastic functions c(R1)
and δ(R2) the equilibrium price of migration visas will be quite low. Such
a policy of legalisation will be ineffective at limiting migration flows, unless
investments into additional repression are extremely large. This may pose a
policy trade-off: high burden on public finances or large increase in migration
flows, which will be hard to sustain politically.
Moreover, in practice, the way the repressive policy is set up is very im-
portant. The goal is to raise the smugglers’ costs to increase their concentra-
tion, and not necessarily to dismantle existing cartels. Breaking established
smugglers networks might give rise, through the emergence of several smaller
smuggler networks, to more competition in the illegal migration business and,
hence, to lower prices and higher demand.34
5.3 Links with current policies
The idea of selling visas has already fed many debates in the general press and
blogs, and policy proposals have discussed different ways of implementing it,
notably through auctions (Simon, 1989, Becker, 1992, the Becker-Posner blog
of 31rst July 2005, Freeman, 2006, Saint Paul, 2009, Orrenius and Zavodny
2010, The Economist, 24 June 2010).35 Despite the controversy, selling visas
34The failure of the ”war on drugs” launched in the United States in the 1980s has
been partly explained by such effects. The US authorities decided to infiltrate the drug
mafia to dismantle it. The infiltration operation, which was very costly, was successful.
The dismantling of the well organized cartels which followed gave rise to the emergence
of many smaller drug networks fighting fiercely in price to gain market share. As a result,
the consumption of cocaine increased in the US (see Poret 2002).
35The proponents argue that selling visas allows a government to both collect money and
better control migration flows. The opponents argue that the sale of visas may generate
a new type of bonded labour between indebted migrants and their employers and that
the market does not necessarily allocate resources efficiently. However these arguments
are even more compelling for the illegal migration market, on which candidates are less
likely to get formal loans to pay the high smugglers’ fees. With the same aim of designing
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to eliminate the smuggling industry and regulate the migration market has
not yet been analysed. Our approach allows us to derive tractable results
on the effects of a large set of policy measures - sale of visas versus more
traditional repressive policies through border enforcement, deportation or
employers’ sanctions - on the equilibrium of the market for smuggled mi-
grants. Our results show that only a combination of them may be effective
at both weakening smugglers’ businesses and controlling migration flows.
Selling visas also limits the increases in budget deficit entailed by stricter
controls.
It is common to oppose these two types of public intervention, legalisation
and repression, in political debates. In the US for example, people on the
right and Republicans are typically accusing Democrats of being soft on the
issue of illegal migration: ”While Democrats believe in supporting a path
to citizenship for illegal immigrants, Republicans support stronger border
patrols and stronger repercussions for those caught in the U.S. illegally, as
well as those who employ them or help them falsify documentation.”36 Yet
our analysis shows that legalisation of migration through the sale of visas and
significant investment in repression are complementary. Recently, many of
the proposed changes to immigration policy in the US have reflected a hybrid
approach, presented in the Comprehensive Immigration Reform of 2013 as
a compromise combining some legalisation alongside stricter enforcement of
the border. Our analysis shows that pushing further this mix of legalisation
and repression policies is more than a political compromise: it is efficient.
Moreover our results regarding the complementarities of instruments call
into question the rationale of current policies. In the past decades border
controls have been constantly reinforced in spite of very small effects, at the
margin, on migration flows and there are large discrepancies in most OECD
market tools to control migration flows, Moraga and Rapoport (2013) have set up a model
where host countries trade immigration quotas.
36In Democratic View on Immigration October 2014 by republicanviews.org
http://www.republicanviews.org/democratic-view-on-immigration/
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countries between the amounts invested in border control versus employer’s
sanctions. For example, in 2008 in France, only 1706 labour inspectors were
employed for more than 3.8 million firms.37 Among those firms, only 1.6
million, the largest ones, were eligible for a control although many illegal
migrants work in small construction firms and in restaurants.38 At the same
time France has spent hundred of millions of euros on repression measures
such as dismantling illegal immigrants’ camps, police enforcement at the bor-
ders and deportation measures. Similarly in the US, there is very little en-
forcement against illegal immigration at worksites (Hanson, 2007). Between
1999 and 2003, the number of man hours US immigration agents devoted
to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 to 180,000 hours and few US
employers who hire illegal immigrants are detected or prosecuted.39 But con-
siderable amounts have been constantly invested in the controls of the US
borders.40 For instance the Border Patrol, which was increased from 9,000
agents in 2001 to 20,000 in 2009, costs an estimated $4 billion annually.
Given these discrepancies and the availability of new technologies, rein-
forcing systematic controls of undocumented workers at the workplace may
offer a more efficient means of dampening illegal labour migration flows than
reinforcing border controls. It is striking that despite several attempts to
37See the report ”L’inspection du travail en France en 2008”, Ministe`re du travail, des
relations sociales, de la famille, de la solidarite´ et de la ville, Direction ge´ne´rale du travail
Service de l’animation territoriale de la politique du travail et de l’action de l’inspection
du travail.
38With only 22590 controls to check for illegal workers, an eligible firm is inspected on
average once every 70 years, or alternatively faces a 1.42% probability of being inspected
each year and smaller firms face a 0 probability of inspection.
39The number of US employers paying fines of at least $5.000 for hiring unauthorized
workers was only fifteen in 1990, which fell to twelve in 1994 and to zero in 2004 (see
”Immigration Enforcement : Preliminary Observations on Employment Verification and
Worksite Enforcement” GAO-05-822T June 21, 2005, cited by Hanson 2007, p19.)
40The Washington Post, July 18, 2010 reported that more than 670 miles of border
fences, walls, bollards and spikes that Congress decreed in 2006 at an estimated cost of
$4 billion (plus future maintenance) had been almost completed. Similarly the number of
man hours spent policing the US-Mexico border increased by 2.9 times between 1990 and
2005.
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mandate participation by all U.S. employers in the E-Verify program, an
Internet-based system designed to check the employment authorization sta-
tus of employees, participation is still voluntary, with limited exceptions.
Small businesses and agricultural employers are strongly opposed to manda-
tory E-Verify and actively lobby against it.41 Similarly, within the European
Union, representatives of Business Europe are opposed to the Commission’s
idea that employers should check the validity of residence permits to avoid
the risk of being excluded from public contracts and, under certain circum-
stances, penalised by temporary or permanent closure of their companies in
case of failure (Bertozzi, 2009).
6 Conclusion
This paper has addressed a simple question: is it possible to eliminate human
smuggling by selling visas and regulate migration flows?
The answer is nuanced. The model shows that eliminating smugglers by
using only one policy instrument, a sale of visas at a low enough price, would
be at the cost of increasing migration flows. This would also increase the
skill diversity of migrants. Hence there is a trade-off between suppressing
smugglers or having fewer migrants in the economy. So if the goal is to con-
trol migration, flows are the lowest with a monopolistic smuggler. Increasing
cartelisation of the market through repression contributes to controlling mi-
gration flows. However, such policy is not satisfactory either, as it favors the
emergence of a dominant criminal network. Current policies are designed
to severely restrict legal migration channels by imposing eligibility criteria-
specifying the types of workers eligible for work visas or of individuals eligi-
ble for family reunion- or other rationing devices such as auctions to obtain
41The American Farm Bureau Foundation stated in a note entitled ”2015 Agricultural
Labor Reform” that it ”could have a significant, negative impact on US farm production,
threatening the livelihoods of many farmers and ranchers in labor intensive agriculture.”
see https://www.pfb.com/policy-pfb/issues/899-2013-agricultural-labor-reform
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visas. Far from eliminating the smuggling business, these rationing mecha-
nisms generate a market for illegal migration since many candidates are not
eligible for these legal channels and are willing to pay high fees to human
smugglers.
The paper proposes instead to combine different types of repression mea-
sures with pricing tools to dismantle the smugglers while limiting the increase
in migration flows following the legalisation. Our results highlight the com-
plementarities between pricing tools and different types of repression mea-
sures, which, in practice, target different groups: the smugglers, the illegal
migrants or the firms which employ them.
Since a policy mix using traditional instruments combined with innovat-
ing pricing tools would be more efficient to eliminate smugglers while regu-
lating migration, a question that remains largely open is why this has not yet
been implemented. Although answering this question is beyond the scope of
the paper, we may consider a few hypotheses that are worth investigating in
future work and other fields of social sciences.
In countries like France one immediate answer is that introducing such
pricing schemes in the field of migration may be considered as unethical
or violating human rights.42 Moreover, their implementation would surely
generate many complicated issues such as the feasibility of pricing visas dif-
ferently depending on the country of origin of the applicants or the duration
of the permit.
It is, however, not clear that transparent pricing tools are less ethical
than the existing policy of visa rationing, which creates ”rents” to the lucky
applicants, generates important monetary hidden costs, such as briberies,
paid by all applicants, and feeds all kinds of illegal activities. And, from
a practical viewpoint, selling visa is both consistent with the law of most
countries and possible. In fact, many countries already sell visas at high
42Moreover, people may not be willing to trade a sacred value such as the right to immi-
grate for money -what psychologist Philip Tetlock (2007) refers to as a ”taboo tradeoff”.
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prices to entrepreneurs or investors in order to boost businesses, capital in-
vestments or simply attract revenues. This is for instance the case in Malta
(650 000 euros), Australia, United Kingdom (1.5 millions dollars in bonds),
United-State of America, (visa EB-5 in exchange of 500 000 dollars produc-
tive investment), Singapore (2 million dollars), Netherland, Mauritius, Spain
(500 000 euros investment in real estate), Greece (250 000 euros investment
in real estate), Portugal (500 000 euros investment in real estate), France (10
million euros), various Caribbean island...Since these prices are very high,
smugglers can compete by offering ”low-costs” services to candidates who
are not financially able to pay for the ”Golden Investor visas”. At the other
end of the spectrum of the migration market, some countries such as Is-
rael, Cyprus and Lebanon have been regulating long distance migration of
cheap labour through local agencies located in South-East Asian countries
such as Philippines and Sri Lanka. These legal intermediaries screen the
candidates and organise their shipment for a relatively low price, which is
also co-financed by employers to compensate for shortages in labour.43 Yet,
migration through this channel is rationed, which again generates an illegal
market for those who are not eligible and those who are overstaying their
temporary visas.
A second hypothesis is that natives may prefer to have lowly paid illegal
immigrants rather than a larger number of legal workers, who would enjoy a
more complete set of rights. Moreover, although reinforcing sanctions paid by
employers of illegal migrants would be a more cost-effective way to combine
legalisation with migration control than reinforcing border controls, such
policy would typically encounter strong resistance from powerful lobbies.
The status quo reflects complex political-economy issues with some people
benefitting more than others from lax enforcement. These considerations may
43Canada also offers visas for temporary workers, which are highly successful. In
2011, more than 192,000 foreign workers entered Canada under this Program, see
Fact Sheet http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/employers/temp-foreign-
worker-program.asp
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explain why, under current policies, a large number of illegal migrants still
bear the costs of being exploited in destination areas and face the constant
risk of being deported.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Market Equilibrium and an illustration in the case
of uniform distribution
We model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as a generalized
Cournot competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e., each smug-
gler has the same market share). Let P I(Q) = (dwf −wh)F−1(1−Q) denote
the inverse demand function for illegal migration. Smuggler j = 1, .., N
maximises with respect to quantity Qj the profit function:
pij(Qj, Q−j) =
[
P I(Qj +Q−j)− c]Qj
where Q−j =
∑
k 6=j Q
k is the offer made by the competitors of j = 1, ..., N .
The first order condition is sufficient under the assumption that the demand
function is not too convex. In a symmetric equilibrium Qj = Q
N
and the
generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such that (3) holds.
We next illustrate the market equilibrium with the example of a uni-
form distribution of skills over [0, 1], which gives easily tractable closed form
solutions. From (1) and (2) we can write explicitly the demand for illegal
migration as:
DI(p) = 1− p
dwf − wh (17)
In the case of a generalized Cournot competition, we can use (3) to establish
that the price is as follows:
pN =
dwf − wh +Nc
N + 1
(18)
such that pm(= p1) =
dwf−wh
2
+ c
2
and p∞(= limN→+∞ pN) = c. We deduce
that the generalized Cournot demand is
DI(pN) =
N
N + 1
(
1− c
dwf − wh
)
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Depending on the degree of competitiveness of the market, measured by
N , the demand is between the demand on monopolistic market DI(pm) =
1
2
− c
2(dwf−wh) , and the demand in perfect competition D
I(c) = 2DI(pm).
Appendix B : Proof of dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0
To show that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 we totally differentiate (3) where the direct price
elasticity of demand, which is derived from (6), is parameterized by pL. We
obtain that
dpI(pL)
dpL
= − (p
I − c)∂2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI∂pL
+ 1
N
∂DI(pI ,pL)
∂pL
N+1
N
∂DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI
+ (pI − c)∂2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI2
(19)
Second order condition of the oligopoly optimization problem implies that
the denominator is negative. Since the two commodities are substitutes (i.e.,
∂DI
∂pL
≥ 0), a sufficient condition for the numerator to be positive is that
∂2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI∂pL
> 0. Using equation (6) we can easily show that this is always
true as long as f ′(θ) ≤ 0, which characterises for example the case with a
uniform distribution (f ′(θ) = 0 over the support). By virtue of equation
(20) below with a uniform distribution we get ∂
2DI(pI ,pL)
∂pI∂pL
= 0. It is also true
when the density function is strictly decreasing as in developing countries
where the vast majority of people do not have any education and are thus
low skilled. QED
Appendix C: Uniform Distribution Example for Proposition 2
This section develops Proposition 2 in the case of a uniform distribution
of skills distributed over 0 and 1. The demand faced by the smugglers when
the government proposes a (legal) migration price, pL, is:
DI(pI , pL) =
∫ pL−pI
(1−d)wf
pI
dwf−wh
f(θ)dθ =
∫ pL−pI
(1−d)wf
pI
dwf−wh
dθ =
pL − pI
(1− d)wf −
pI
dwf − wh (20)
47
We deduce that the inverse demand function faced by the smugglers is:
P I(Q, pL) =
dwf − wh
wf − wh (p
L − (1− d)wfQ) (21)
Smuggler j = 1, .., N maximises with respect to qj the profit function:
pij(qj, Q−j) =
[
P I(qj +Q−j, pL)− c] qj
where c represents the marginal costs for the smuggler and Q−j =
∑
k 6=j q
k is
the offer made by the competitors of j = 1, ..., N . In a symmetric equilibrium
qj = Q
N
so that the Cournot quantity QN is such that:
P I(QN , pL)− c+ ∂P
I(QN , pL)
∂QN
QN
N
= 0 (22)
Symmetrically the generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such
that:
pN − c
pN
=
1
N
1
εDI ,pI
(23)
Second order condition requires that
∂2P I(Q, pL)
∂Q2
Q
N
+ 2
∂P I(Q, pL)
∂Q
≤ 0 (24)
which is always true with the uniform distribution example (see (21)). Sub-
stituting (21) in the equation (22) we deduce that
QN(pL) =
N
N + 1
(pL − c wf − wh
dwf − wh )
1
(1− d)wf (25)
or, alternatively, that
PN(pL) = P I(QN(pL), pL) =
pL
N + 1
dwf − wh
wf − wh +
N
1 +N
c (26)
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We now turn to showing that such reaction smugglers price is smaller than
the price imposed by the smugglers under unconstrained oligopoly. With the
uniform distribution example, replacing (26) into (10) the upper limit for the
visa price satisfies:
pL = [Nc+ (1 +N)(1− d)wf ] wf − wh
(1− d)wf +N(wf − wh) (27)
Comparing the reaction smugglers price pI(pL) with the unconstrained smug-
glers’ oligopoly price pN =
dwf−wh+Nc
N+1
defined in (18) it is straightforward to
check that pI(pL) ≤ pN if and only if dwf − wh ≥ c, which is a necessary
condition for the smugglers to be active in the first place. Indeed from (1),
we obtain that: dwf − wh > pI otherwise there is no illegal migrant. More-
over, necessarily c < pI otherwise smugglers do not operate. Therefore, when
smugglers operate, the condition c < dwf −wh is necessarily satisfied, which
implies that pI(pL) < p
N . QED
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
Let pL(R1, R2) =
wf−wh
d(R2)wf−wh c(R1) be the price which pushes smugglers
out of business and let DL(R1, R2) = 1− F
(
pL(R1,R2)
wf−wh
)
the legal demand for
visas associated with this price. The problem (14) the government aims to
solve is equivalent to:
max
R1,R2
pL(R1, R2) s.t. R1 +R2 ≤ B (28)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1, R2) + λ
{
B − (R1 +R2)
}
(29)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1, 2 :
∂L
∂Rk
=
∂pL
∂Rk
− λ (30)
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Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1, R2) satisfies
necessarily ∂L
∂R1
= ∂L
∂R2
, such that:
∂pL
∂R2
=
∂pL
∂R1
, which yields equation (15). And the Lagrangian derivative with respect to
λ yields that the budget constraint is equalised.
Considering the special case when the government funds the investments
in repression with the sale of visas, the problem (14) the government aims
to solve becomes:
max
R1,R2
pL(R1, R2) s.t. R1 +R2 ≤ DL(R1, R2)pL(R1, R2) (31)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1, R2) + λ
{
DL(R1, R2)p
L(R1, R2)− (R1 +R2)
}
(32)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1, 2 :
∂L
∂Rk
=
∂pL
∂Rk
(
1 + λDL(R1, R2)
)
+ λpL(R1, R2)
∂DL
∂Rk
− λ (33)
Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1, R2) satisfies
necessarily ∂L
∂R1
= ∂L
∂R2
, which yields:
∂pL
∂R2
(
1 + λDL(R1, R2)
)
+ λpL(R1, R2)
∂DL
∂R2
=
∂pL
∂R1
(
1 + λDL(R1, R2)
)
+ λpL(R1, R2)
∂DL
∂R1
Simplifying this expression by noting that ∂D
L
∂Rk
= −
∂pL
∂Rk
wf−whf
(
pL(R1,R2)
wf−wh
)
, the
optimal combinaison of (R1, R2) is such that
∂pL
∂R1
=
∂pL
∂R2
, which yields equation
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(15). And the Lagrangian derivative with respect to λ yields that the budget
constraint is equalised in (16). These two equations determine the optimal
combination of repression (R1, R2).
We now check with a simple example that the set of functions supporting
an interior solution is not empty.
An example: Let’s assume that wh ' 0 and that c(R) = c1+2R1+R and
d(R) = d
1+R
. Consistently with the model assumptions c(R) is increasing
and concave and d(R) is decreasing and convex. Let’s note k(R) = c
′(R)
c(R)
=
1
(1+R)(1+2R)
and let g(R) = −d
′(R−R)
d(R−R) =
1
1+R−R for all R ∈ [0, R] with R being
a fixed point such that R = DL(R,R−R)pL(R,R−R). The interior solution
of our problem is determined by that: k(R) = g(R).44
R∗2(R) = R−R∗1(R) = R + 1−
√
1 +
R
2
(34)
It is easy to check that both R∗1(R) and R
∗
2(R) take their value between [0, R].
They constitute an interior solution of the optimisation problem.
Let pL(R) = pL(R∗1(R), R
∗
2(R)) and D
L(R) = DL(R∗1(R), R
∗
2(R)). To
complete the proof we need to show that there exists a fixed point, R > 0,
such that R = DL(R)pL(R).
The assumption wh ' 0 implies that pL(R) = c(R
∗
1)
d(R∗2)
= c
d
1+2R∗1
1+R∗1
(1 + R∗2).
Substituting R∗1 and R
∗
2 by their value from (34) and rearranging the expres-
sion we get
pL(R) =
c
d
(√
2(2 +R)− 1
)2
(35)
We deduce that R is the solution to:
R =
c
d
(√
2(2 +R)− 1)2(1− c
dwfθ
(√
2(2 +R)− 1)2) (36)
44It is easy to check that k′(R) < 0 and that g′(R) > 0 ∀R ∈ [0, R]. Since k(R) is
strictly decreasing and g(R) is strictly increasing for all R ∈ [0, R], and since g(0) < k(0),
and g(R) > k(R) ∀R > 0, there exists an unique interior solution to k(R) = g(R).
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The demand is defined if 1 ≥ c
dwfθ
(√
2(2 +R)− 1)2 , which is equivalent to
R ≤ Rmax = 0.5
(
1 +
√
dwfθ
c
)2
− 2. We deduce that Rmax > 0 if and only if
dwfθ
c
> 1 (37)
Note that this assumption is always verified whenever there is some human
smuggling: c < dwfθ. Therefore R
max > 0 and it is straightforward to
check that R exists. Indeed when R = 0 the left hand side of equation (36)
is equal to LHS(0) = 0, while the right hand side is equal to RHS(0) =
c
d
(
1− c
dwfθ
)
> 0 under (37). Symmetrically the left hand side of equation
(36) when R = Rmax is equal to LHS(Rmax) = Rmax > 0 under (37), while
RHS(Rmax) = 0. Since both functions are continuous they cross necessarily
at least once at R ∈ (0, Rmax). Moreover, after noting that:
RHS ′(R) = 2
c
d
[√
2(2 +R)− 1√
2(2 +R)
]{
1− c
dwfθ
2(
√
2(2 +R)− 1)2
}
we can check that RHS ′(R) < 0⇔ dwfθ < 2c(
√
2(2 +R)−1)2, which is for
instance true if 2 >
dwfθ
c
> 1. In this case the function LHS(.) is increasing
and RHS(.) is decreasing: they cross only once. QED
Appendix E: The case of negative selection
Since our main focus is to design a policy to eliminate smugglers, which
are primarily used in long haul migration, we assumed in the presentation
of the model that workers self-select positively through migration accord-
ing to their skill level. This generates interesting findings as a government
will compete with smugglers to attract the highest skilled of the candidates
for illegal migration by selling migration visas. However, depending on the
relative returns to skill in the origin and destination countries the case of
negative self-selection of workers through illegal migration cannot be ruled
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out, in particular for low-costs cross-border migration.
To give the intuition of how the results would change in the case of neg-
ative selection, we adopt the extreme assumption that workers working in
the illegal sector of the destination country are paid at a flat rate, dθwf
which does not depend on their skill. After writing the migration condition
as θwh < dθwf − pI , we can solve for the skill threshold, denoted θI , below
which an individual prefers to migrate illegally than not to migrate:
θI =
dθwf − pI
wh
(38)
After aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand for
illegal migration as a function of migration price pI :
DI(pI) =
∫ θI
θ
f(θ)dθ = F (θI) (39)
As θI decreases with pI and wh and increases with d and wf , it is easy to
show that, once again, the demand for illegal migration is higher the lower
the migration price, pI , and the higher the difference between the income
earned as an illegal migrant, dθwf , and the income in the home country, wh.
We next study what happens if the government enters the migration
market by selling visas. We consider the case where wages of legal migrants
are independent of their skills. This is for example the case of migrants
hosted by destination countries to work on specific work contracts in sector
where there is a shortage of low skilled labour, such as immigrants working in
agriculture in California. If the government sells visas at price pL, migration
candidates prefer to migrate legally rather than illegally as long as θwf−pL ≥
θdwf −pI . If the government wants to eradicate smugglers through a pricing
policy it has to sell visas at the price
pL = c+ (1− d)θwf . (40)
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As in the case of positive selection, the only way to eliminate the smugglers
through a ”pure” sale of visas is to push their reaction price below their
marginal costs. With such a pricing strategy the marginal migrant, indiffer-
ent between migrating legally and staying at home, is such that:
θL =
θwf − pL
wh
. (41)
Replacing pL by its value from (40) yields θL =
dθwf−c
wh
, which is the threshold
in (38) evaluated at pI = c. In other words, a policy that reduces the number
of illegal migrants to zero through the sale of visas yields the same level of
migration as under perfect competition among smugglers. Therefore Propo-
sition 1 holds true under negative selection. It is also easy to show that the
main message of proposition 2 still holds, such that whenever the government
enters the market by selling visas, migration demand increases. One differ-
ence, however, is that selling visas leads, in this case, to an improvement of
the skill composition of migrants since θL > θI.
Since the average skill of migrants increases (respectively, decreases) fol-
lowing the policy when the self-selection of workers through illegal migration
is negative (positive), we have also shown that the policy increases the skills
diversity of migrants in all cases.
Studying θL =
dθwf−c
wh
, it is easy to show that, as in the case of posi-
tive selection, the only way a government can control migration following a
legalisation policy through the sale of visas is to increase repression. This
reinforces our main message showing that policy makers must combine strict
repression with sale of visas if the aim is to both legalise migration and
control migration demand.
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Figure 1: Pricing scheme of the smugglers pI(pL) as a function of the price of visas in the uniform example
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Figure 2 : Migration Demand as a function of price of visas in the uniform example 
